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The Early Decision Option in College
Admission and Its Impact
on Student Diversity
Heather Antecol Claremont McKenna College
Janet Kiholm Smith Claremont McKenna College
Abstract
Colleges and universities that adopt early decision (ED) as an admission practice
can generate additional resources by attracting wealthier students who make
binding commitments to attend and forgo shopping for competing aid offers.
An unanswered question is whether the resources generated from price dis-
crimination are used by schools during the regular admission process to attract
more diverse students. Using a sample of private national universities and liberal
arts colleges, we model the choice to adopt an ED program and its impact on
students’ racial and geographic diversity. We find that schools facing more
competition for students are more likely to adopt an ED program. The overall
heterogeneity of students is lower for schools that adopt ED, and heterogeneity
decreases as schools enroll larger percentages of students through ED. Higher
ED enrollment percentages appear to strongly and negatively affect Asian Amer-
ican and Hispanic students and positively affect white students.
1. Introduction
Each year, tens of thousands of college applicants compete for spots at universities
and colleges and may have opportunities to decide whether to apply to a school
under an early admission program or to use the regular admission process. There
are two basic types of early admission programs—early decision (ED) and early
action (EA). The primary distinction is that ED requires that the student enroll
in the school, but EA does not. Our study focuses on ED, which is more common
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than EA and has become increasingly prevalent over the last 2 decades. Under
ED, students receive early notification of admission in return for a binding
commitment to attend a specific school. A student who desires an ED can select
one school to apply for an ED and is notified of the decision several months
before the regular decision announcement date.
Particularly interesting from an economics perspective is the binding aspect
of the ED option, which is explicit in the agreement that the student signs.1
Applying early both reveals a student’s inelastic demand for the selected school
and augments the inelasticity through the student’s commitment to forgo other
financial aid offers. The forfeited offers may include merit-based aid and have
competing packages of need-based aid that are more attractive. This agreement
enables schools to price discriminate across students to a greater extent than
would be possible if schools were required to compete for all students.2
Just as students must decide whether to apply early, school administrators
must decide whether to adopt an ED program and, if so, what percentage of
the matriculating class to admit early. Schools may use ED programs to help
manage enrollments, identify applicants with strong preferences for their schools,
and generate higher net tuition revenue. A school might forgo an ED program
because of additional administrative costs relative to the anticipated low ED
yield, because its pool of highly qualified applicants is deep enough that it can
ration its funds effectively without reliance on an ED program to signal intensity
of demand, or because of concern about the impact on cohort quality.
The net welfare effect of ED programs on students is unclear. Students who
do not qualify for need-based financial aid and apply early lose the benefit of
competitive merit-based aid offers, but they may gain higher probabilities of
being admitted. Students who qualify for need-based aid and apply early to a
need-blind school that does not offer merit-based aid lose the benefit of com-
petitive (potentially more attractive) need-based aid offers and forgo the potential
for merit-based aid, but they may gain higher probabilities of being admitted.3
1 A student who violates the agreement, such as by applying early to more than one school or by
shopping for other admission offers after having been admitted early, is subject to having the ad-
mission decision and financial aid offer withdrawn. In addition to the student, the student’s parents
and college counselor also are required to sign. See, for example, The Common Application, 2012–
2013 Early Decision Agreement (https://www.commonapp.org/CommonApp/Docs/DownloadForms/
2013/2013EarlyDecision_download.pdf). The agreement is further enforced through schools’ mutual
monitoring of applicants and reporting of early decision (ED) violators to the admitting school.
2 For students admitted early, the college financial aid office provides a financial aid package along
with the admission letter. If the initial aid offer is viewed as inadequate, the student is encouraged
to consult with the financial aid director and resolve the problem. However, the student does not
have the benefit of observing competing offers, so information about what is adequate is incomplete,
and students’ bargaining power is minimal. For articles describing the ED process, see the National
Association of College Admission Counseling (http://www.nacacnet.org).
3 “Need blind” means that schools make admission decisions independent of the applicant’s fi-
nancial need, although not all need-blind schools commit to fully meeting the financial need of
applicants. Even among the schools that do commit to fully meeting students’ financial needs, the
nature of the awards can vary—including a mix of debt, grants, work-study funds, and so forth.
Some schools are need blind but offer merit awards to top students; others are need blind and only
meet financial needs and do not make any other awards.
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It is reasonable to expect that students who qualify for need-based financial aid
are less likely to apply ED because by doing so they forgo the opportunity to
seek competing offers of either merit- or need-based aid. Moreover, if schools
admit high percentages of students early, the aggregate capacity for non-ED
admission is reduced relative to the demand, so the intensity of competition
may be reduced and fewer high-need students may be admitted.
Consistent with the use of ED programs to increase net tuition and reduce
competition, Avery, Fairbanks, and Zeckhauser (2003) find that ED applicants
gain an admissions advantage that is approximately equivalent to 100 additional
SAT points. They confirm that these applicants tend to come from affluent
socioeconomic backgrounds. For those students who are concerned about fi-
nancial aid, applying early may subject them to an increased risk of receiving a
less favorable financial aid offer than if they had applied for regular admission
and were able to review competing aid offers.
Because of concerns about how ED can skew a cohort, several prominent
school administrators have expressed reservations about the merits of ED, a few
wealthy, highly selective schools have abandoned it, and a compelling public
debate has ensued.4
Because ED programs can increase the net tuition revenue, a school with a
fixed total enrollment may be able to use the higher revenues from ED admissions
to fund enrollment of a higher proportion of students who qualify for need-
based aid. That is, the higher than average net tuition paid by affluent ED students
could subsidize students who qualify for need-based aid to a greater extent than
if the school had to use its financial aid resources to compete for meritorious
wealthy students. The cohort quality could be increased by adding diversity
without reducing average ability. Alternatively, a school that introduced ED and
sought to hold the cohort quality constant would have an increase in net tuition
revenue that could be applied to other uses. In addition, a school that sought
to maximize its net tuition revenue and was willing, on the margin, to sacrifice
cohort quality would generate still more revenue for alternative uses and would
have a shift toward wealthier students.
While there is evidence that the ED option is used more often by wealthier
students (see Avery, Fairbanks, and Zeckhauser 2003), there is no systematic
study of how reliance on ED programs affects the racial and geographic diversity
of enrolled students. The research question of how admission programs affect
diversity takes on even more importance in light of the Supreme Court decisions
in Gratz v. Bollinger (539 U.S. 244 [2003]) and Grutter v. Bollinger (539 U.S. 306
[2003]). These decisions stand for the proposition that educational diversity is
4 Harvard, Princeton, and the University of Virginia recently eliminated ED, citing evidence that
it favored wealthy applicants who do not need to compare financial aid offers (Lewin 2008). In their
study of highly selective colleges, Avery, Fairbanks, and Zeckhauser (2003, p. 59) report that “among
those students for whom financial aid was not a concern, 78.0 percent applied early to some college”;
among students for whom “financial aid was important to their choice of college, only 48.0 percent
applied early.”
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a compelling interest that justifies the consideration of race in admission prac-
tices. Dozens of schools joined the University of Michigan in these cases, arguing
that a diverse student body is essential to their missions (see, for example, Brief
of Amherst College et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 4, Grutter
v. Bollinger [2003] [no. 02-242] and Gratz v. Bollinger [2003] [no. 02-516]).
Many of these schools, nonetheless, rely on ED programs for admission.
In this study, based on data from 189 private national universities and liberal
arts colleges in the United States from 2004 to 2007, we find evidence that ED
has a negative impact on cohort diversity, measured as a Herfindahl-Hirshman
index (HHI) of student body ethnic heterogeneity and as percentages of enrolled
students who are white, African American, Asian American, Hispanic, and Native
American. We also consider geographic origin as an aspect of diversity and find
a positive significant effect of ED on the percentage of students enrolled from
out of state. The tests we employ control for the endogeneity of school choice
to adopt an ED program and for other variables such as school type and size,
endowment, test scores, and the heterogeneity of the school’s primary market
area.
For the subset of schools that use ED programs (64 percent of the observa-
tions), we examine how the percentage of students enrolled through an ED
program varies with racial and geographic diversity. We find that racial hetero-
geneity decreases as schools’ reliance on ED enrollment increases. The most
pronounced negative effects are for Asian Americans and Hispanics, relative to
other groups, and their representation decreases more as schools increase their
reliance on ED and/or EA programs. Enrollments of white students and out-of-
state students increase significantly as schools rely more on ED programs.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 1, we describe the emergence
of early admission programs and briefly review the literature regarding historical
admission and financial aid practices in the market for higher education. In
Section 2, we provide a model of a school’s policy choice to use an ED program
and how the choice might affect its ability to meet multiple objectives. Section
3 describes our data. In Section 4, we examine the empirical determinants of a
school’s choice to use an ED program, and in Section 5, we present the analysis
of the impact of ED on student diversity. Section 6 concludes.
2. Emergence of Early Decision as an Admission Practice
The liberal arts colleges in the northeastern United States known as the Seven
Sisters began experimenting with ED programs around 1959.5 Amherst College,
Williams College, and other elite small liberal arts colleges adopted formal ED
5 The Seven Sisters are Barnard College, Bryn Mawr College, Mount Holyoke College, Radcliffe
College, Smith College, Vassar College, and Wellesley College.
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programs in the early 1960s.6 In their historical account, Duffy and Goldberg
(1998) explain that ED programs were developed in response to a broader trend
in higher education, as students began submitting applications to multiple col-
leges and universities. This increase in applications per student resulted in in-
stitutions competing more aggressively for students while trying to reduce their
enrollment uncertainty. Early decision programs helped to ensure the size of the
first-year class. Duffy and Goldberg (1998, p. 50) cite a 1977 report to secondary
school counselors by the dean of admissions at Amherst College, Edward Wall.
Wall explained that Amherst’s ED program “serves as the foundation of the class.
The holes will be filled in later under regular admission.” More specifically, the
ED program provided Amherst with a way to combat its losses to its three top
competitors (Harvard University, Yale University, and Princeton University).
By the mid-1970s, all the Ivy League schools and the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT) had adopted early admission programs—Brown University,
Harvard, MIT, Princeton, and Yale initially used nonbinding EA agreements, and
the others used binding ED agreements. In the late 1970s, the EA schools
amended their rules to prevent students from applying to more than one school
early (this type of agreement is known as restrictive early action).7 These elite
schools have continued to refine their approaches to early admission, making
headlines whenever a major change is announced. Princeton, for example, has
made several changes to its policy, moving from EA to ED and most recently
deciding to abandon early admission altogether.
1.1. The Ivy Overlap Group Practices
Early decision policies evolved, along with other financial aid policies, as
colleges and universities tried to adapt to the demands of a more mobile society
and to compete for talented students from middle-income and lower-income
families. Whereas a direct effect of ED programs was to restrict merit-based aid
competition for students who were willing to forgo searching for competitive
aid offers, some schools also entered into agreements to refrain from making
merit-based aid awards to students who applied during the regular admission
decision period. As is well documented elsewhere, during the 1950s, the eight
Ivy League schools and MIT formed the Ivy Overlap Group and began to meet
6 The success of the Seven Sisters’ ED plans prompted other selective coed and all-male colleges
to adopt similar policies during the early 1960s. Duffy and Goldberg (1998) identify the Ohio Five
as early adopters: Denison University, Kenyon College, Oberlin College, Ohio Wesleyan University,
and the College of Wooster.
7 There currently are two types of early action (EA) plans—regular and restrictive. Neither requires
a binding commitment, and, consequently, neither generates the same type of strategic implications
for the student or school as does ED. The restrictive EA plans allow students to apply to an institution
of preference and receive a decision well in advance of the institution’s regular response date, but
the school restricts student applications to other early plans (Stanford, for example, currently uses
this plan). Regular EA plans also allow students to apply for an early decision, but students are free
to apply to other schools and to other EA plans (MIT). Under neither plan is the student obligated
to attend the institution that offers early admission or to submit a deposit prior to the regular due
date. Schools may have both an ED and an EA plan.
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regularly to collectively determine the amount of family contribution that would
be used by each school to determine the financial assistance that would be
awarded to students admitted to multiple member schools and to refrain from
awarding merit-based aid.8 Over time, the practices followed by the Ivy Overlap
Group spread to 14 other prestigious northeastern private universities and liberal
arts colleges, which all had early admission plans in place.9
In 1991, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed suit against the Ivy Overlap
Group, alleging that its meetings and related agreements were elements of a
conspiracy to eliminate price competition (see United States v. Brown University,
805 F. Supp. 288 [E.D. Pa. 1992]). Soon after the suit was filed, the eight Ivy
League schools entered into consent agreements with the DOJ. Massachusetts
Institute of Technology did not settle and chose to argue the merits of the practice
on several grounds, including effective use of the school’s limited resources to
promote the socioeconomic diversity of enrolled students.10
After an initial adverse district court ruling, MIT appealed and eventually
settled with the DOJ, entering into a consent decree that limited cooperative
activity among schools in the Ivy Overlap Group (United States v. Brown Uni-
versity, 5 F.3d 658 [3d Cir. 1993]). Under the settlement, schools still could
engage in some Overlap-type behavior.11
Carlton, Bamberger, and Epstein (1995), in their empirical study, find no
significant evidence that Overlap practices resulted in higher than average tuition
for students at those schools. In their view, the evidence is consistent with the
schools’ avowed public interest objective of refraining from merit awards to
make more resources available to students with high levels of financial need
8 Carlton, Bamberger, and Epstein (1995) and Hoxby (2000) provide details and an economic
perspective of the Ivy Overlap Group procedures related to financial aid offers. The family contri-
bution is the portion of the total financial need that is expected to be provided by the student’s
family.
9 Carlton, Bamberger, and Epstein (1995) report that Ivy Overlap Group meetings included the
Ivy League schools, MIT, and 14 others by the 1970s. Eventually, Brown University, Columbia
University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard University, MIT, Princeton University,
the University of Pennsylvania, Yale University, Amherst College, Barnard College, Bowdoin College,
Bryn Mawr College, Colby College, Middlebury College, Mount Holyoke College, Smith College,
Trinity College, Tufts University, Vassar College, Wellesley College, Wesleyan University, and Williams
College were members.
10 Massachusetts Institute of Technology claimed that (1) the purpose of the Ivy Overlap Group
was “to advance educational access and socioeconomic diversity and to maximize the effective use
of private charitable funds. In so doing, they neither sought nor obtained any financial or commercial
benefit”; (2) because not-for-profit firms have multifaceted objectives, it is not possible to infer the
consequences of price fixing on price output or quality; (3) the practice was justified on social welfare
grounds—that the Ivy Overlap Group promoted the social ideal of equality of educational access
and opportunity; and (4) controlling for various factors, the collective actions of the Ivy Overlap
Group did not result in significantly higher average net tuition (United States v. Brown University,
5 F.3d 658 [3d Cir. 1993]). See Bamberger and Carlton (2004) and Carlton, Bamberger, and Epstein
(1995).
11 Because Brown University was unable to commit to need-blind admission for all students, one
of the conditions of the agreement, the Ivy Overlap Group process stopped (Carlton, Bamberger,
and Epstein 1995). The settlement was reinforced by federal legislation in 1994: the Need-Based
Educational Aid Act. Congress has renewed the bill several times since 1994, most recently in 2008.
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(augmented by the need-blind admission policy). They also reasoned that the
heterogeneity of school choices would make successful collusion unlikely. The
settlement and subsequent legislation are consistent with this view. Under current
law, permissible conduct includes pooling information about students, agreeing
not to give merit-based aid, and using common principles to determine aid.
While discussions about financial aid awards to individual students are not
permitted, audits are allowed, for the purpose of detecting school practices that
deviate from agreed-upon principles.
Afram (2006) argues that the Ivy Overlap Group decision opened up financial
aid as a form of competition among selective private schools (also see Hoxby
[2000] for empirical support that the end of the Ivy Overlap Group meetings
created a catalyst for increased competition for high-achieving students). She
finds that, as a result of the suit, financial aid at the Ivy Overlap Group colleges
became less progressive with respect to parents’ income and more sensitive to
merit, as measured by standard aptitude tests. Even though many of the schools
in the Ivy Overlap Group remained need blind and were committed to fully
satisfying the needs of their admitted applicants, Hoxby points out that there is
sufficient flexibility in the definition of need to accommodate small but significant
changes in actual practice. Hence, there is some evidence that, following the
settlement, financial aid practices changed and competition on some dimensions
intensified among Ivy Overlap Group members.
1.2. The Diffusion of Early Admission Programs
The early adopters of early admission programs paved the way for significant
changes in admission practices of other leading colleges and universities through-
out the United States. Faced with a long-term demographic shift associated with
the end of the post–World War II baby boom and an increase in the intensity
of shopping behavior by college applicants, colleges and universities in the 1980s
and 1990s turned increasingly to reliance on early admission programs to help
manage enrollment, increase yield, and control financial aid awards. In addition,
especially during the mid- to late 1990s, when the economy was growing rapidly,
private schools faced increased competitive pressure from public schools, which
began offering merit-based scholarships. However, as the economy slowed and
higher education resources became more constrained, even public institutions
began to look for ways to limit their financial aid expenditures. A beneficial
result for schools adopting ED programs was that it afforded them better control
over their financial aid outlays. This control was possible because students ap-
plying early generally are wealthier and less likely to apply for financial aid than
are students applying during the regular admission period (Avery, Fairbanks,
and Zeckhauser 2003).12 Although many private schools describe themselves as
12 Avery, Fairbanks, and Zeckhauser (2003) focused on 14 highly selective colleges for which they
had detailed data on each applicant from the 1991–92 to 1996–97 academic years. They show that
acceptance rates during early decision rounds are higher than those for the regular decision periods
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need blind, the schools are aware that their ED applicant pool is less concerned
about financial aid. The 2002 College Handbook observes, “Some colleges find
that they can stretch their limited financial aid budgets by admitting students
[through ED programs] who are not only bright and committed to their school,
but who are also ‘full pay students’, i.e., ones who are not relying on financial
aid” (quoted in Avery, Fairbanks, and Zeckhauser 2003, p. 177).
As reliance on ED was spreading, mechanisms for enforcing ED agreements
with admitted students were evolving. Early decision, after all, would have no
effect if students who were admitted early could costlessly renege on their com-
mitments. Thus, the effectiveness of ED as a means to soften competition for
students depends on the threat of mutual enforcement by adopting schools.
Schools typically require an ED applicant to sign a statement in which the student
promises not only to attend if admitted but also to withdraw all applications
pending at other institutions (see note 1). Afram (2006, pp. 913–14) describes
the process: once a student is admitted under an ED program, the school notifies
the student that it may send a list of the students it has admitted early to its
most important competitors. Those schools may check the list and may terminate
any application that an ED-admitted student has submitted. If a school discovers
that the student had applied under ED to more than one school, that school
would potentially notify the first school, and all schools involved would typically
revoke the student’s admission.13 The implication is that ED is an effective way
for schools to identify inelastic demanders and to augment the inelasticity, thereby
enabling them to limit their financial aid offers to ED applicants to be need-
based ones only. Clearly, not all schools are compelled to take advantage of this
feature. Wealthy, highly selective schools, for example, might view an ED program
as mainly a way to manage their enrollments to targeted numbers and might
not be particularly concerned about the financial aid implications. Moreover, as
in the Ivy Overlap Group case, schools with limited financial aid budgets may
argue that the approach allows them to create public goods by enabling them
to more effectively recruit minority and needier students during the regular
admission period and thereby generate a more diverse student body.
From at least the mid-1990s, the impact of ED programs began to come under
scrutiny from several perspectives. The 2003 Avery, Fairbanks, and Zeckhauser
study incited widespread criticism of ED on the ground that the practice favors
wealthy, less well qualified students.14 Subsequent studies examined how student
and that students who are admitted through an ED program are slightly less qualified than students
admitted during the regular decision round. Controlling for SAT scores and rank in class, they find
that the admission rate of early applicants exceeds that for regular applicants by 15 percentage points
or more.
13 The enforcement of the agreement among schools is also described in Avery, Fairbanks, and
Zeckhauser (2003, pp. 54–56).
14 There was even a push in Congress, initiated by Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts in
the fall of 2003, to open ED admissions practices to greater public scrutiny (see S. 1793, 108th Cong.,
1st sess., sec. [2][I], 302[a], 302[b][2]). The proposal would require colleges with ED programs to
report the percentage of each enrolled class admitted under ED and broken down by race. In addition,
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bargaining power can affect financial aid offers. Lang (2007), for example, finds
evidence of a strategic advantage for students who have two or more college
acceptances, which leads to higher financial aid awards.15 However, these studies
leave one important question partially unanswered. How does reliance on ED
affect the overall socioeconomic diversity of the student body? It is possible that
admitting students early, particularly those who do not require financial aid,
results in a larger financial aid pool available for attracting a diverse student
body. Such a result would be consistent with the purported Ivy Overlap Group
effort to reduce merit-based price competition for high-quality students in order
to serve the social goal of improving the socioeconomic diversity of matriculated
students.
Additional expressions of concern about the merits of ED came from a few
of the most highly selective schools. In 2001, the president of Yale, Richard Levin,
announced that he wanted to end Yale’s ED program. He cited the pressure ED
programs put on high school students to make decisions early and their inability
to compare financial aid offers. Recognizing the game-theoretic aspect of ED
programs, he also noted that Yale could not go it alone without disadvantaging
Yale relative to other schools. He argued that a collective end of the program
would be desirable and indicated that he was investigating the antitrust impli-
cations of such collective action (Arenson 2001). In 2008, Harvard, Princeton,
and the University of Virginia eliminated their ED programs, stating as a rationale
that the programs favored wealthy applicants (Lewin 2008). At the same time,
though, it is clear that abandoning ED programs would put less wealthy and
less highly selective schools at a competitive disadvantage. (See Avery and Levin
[2010], which provides a model that explains why selective schools, particularly
those not at the very top, may benefit from EA programs.)
However, at the same time that a few of the very top schools, in terms of
applicant demand and endowment per student, are reviewing and sometimes
abandoning their ED programs, others are adding them. In our sample, the
majority of liberal arts colleges and almost half of the national private universities
use ED. In 2007, the National Association for College Admission Counseling
took the initiative in defining and articulating best practices for member insti-
tutions.16 All participating schools (all of those in our sample) agree to abide by
these principles. Moreover, ED options are an increasingly prevalent feature of
admission for graduate degree programs offered by law schools and medical
schools. Hence, it is important to understand the implications of these programs
cognizant of the competitive implications of ED, the bill would have waived federal antitrust reg-
ulations to allow schools to develop guidelines to eliminate binding ED admission policies (see Afram
2006, p. 900).
15 See also Epple et al. (2006), who show, using data from Carnegie Mellon University, how signaling
and profiling are important aspects of the college admission process. See also Epple, Romano, and
Sieg (2003) and McMillen, Singell, and Waddell (2007).
16 Definitions and details regarding acceptable admission plans for EA and ED for member insti-
tutions appear in National Association for College Admission Counseling (2007).
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for the types of students who are admitted both early and during the regular
admission cycle.17
2. The Market for Higher Education: Cohort Quality
and Other Objectives
In contrast to the Ivy Overlap Group practices, ED programs present a more
plausible case for competitive harm. As Carlton, Bamberger, and Epstein (1995)
note, schools that seek to maximize revenue would want to price discriminate
across all students, not just those with financial need, and price discrimination
against wealthy students should be more revenue enhancing than price discrim-
ination limited to needy students. Moreover, their observation that price col-
lusion among heterogeneous institutions is unlikely to be effective does not apply
when the agreement has the potential to divide up the market as ED does.
As with the Ivy Overlap Group practices, ED financial aid savings might be
used to increase support for financially needy students and increase overall cohort
diversity. However, it is not possible, on the basis of casual observation, to
determine what objectives colleges seek to maximize with their ED programs.
In contrast to for-profit entities, not-for-profit colleges are not simply profit
maximizers. Much of the current research on the market for higher education
identifies multiple objectives—among other things, cohort quality, value added
to human capital, a consumable academic experience, and faculty welfare—as
potential dimensions of the college objective function.18 Some scholars consider
reputation, financial strength, academic quality, research, and social objectives
such as promoting diversity as probable components of a college’s objective
function (Winston 1999).19
One way a school can pursue its objectives is through its admissions practices.
Rothschild and White (1995) theorize that colleges and universities produce
human capital as an output and view students as inputs and argue that some
types of students enhance the value of the output through their influence on
other students. In return for their contributions, students receive a net wage
equivalent to the value of the subsidized education they receive less their net
tuition cost. In this context, we assume that having more net tuition revenue
from ED students enables colleges to spend more on student inputs, including
socioeconomic diversity of the cohort, which is perceived to add value to the
education the students receive.
The role of price discrimination among private schools in higher education
is well recognized. Winston (1999, p. 30), in response to the question, “Why do
tuitions keep rising?” argues that “sticker prices have risen to allow more price
17 Afram (2006) discusses ED programs in the context of civil rights and antitrust laws.
18 See Winston (1999) for an excellent overview of the economics of higher education.
19 In addition, Bowen and Bok (1998) document the origins of diversity as a topic of educational
thought and the development of race-sensitive admissions policies.
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discrimination in the form of financial aid among potential buyers.”20 Early
decision facilitates price discrimination as it effectively identifies those students
who have the most inelastic demand and binds them to an agreement to enroll
if their needs are fully met. By reducing merit-based aid awards, an ED program
generates resources a college would not otherwise have. The amount of additional
resources varies with the proportion of students admitted through an ED pro-
gram. The resources can be used in various ways, including to provide financial
aid awards to regular-admission students in an effort to improve cohort quality
or to fund other priorities of the school.21 For a school with a fixed entering
class size, the ability to use ED to increase socioeconomic diversity by reallocating
resources to financially needy students is constrained by the ED program itself,
as each additional student admitted by ED eliminates a spot that could have
gone to someone who could contribute more to cohort quality.
How ED programs actually affect cohort diversity is an empirical question.
Indeed, Bowen and Bok (1998) argue that the low number of minority applicants
under early admission programs would lead to lower enrollments of minority
students than usual unless race-sensitive policies were employed to counteract
the effect. However, we reason that additional revenue from ED-admitted stu-
dents may be used to augment affirmative action and other race-sensitive ad-
mission programs and to encourage socioeconomic diversity. If this augmen-
tation occurs to a sufficient degree, then we would expect to see a positive
correlation between an ED program and cohort diversity.
We assume that each school seeks to maximize an objective function over two
arguments: cohort diversity (as an aspect of cohort quality) and other objectives.
The school seeks to maximize with respect to the choice to adopt ED admission
and the percentage of students enrolled under ED. Figure 1 shows the trade-off
between cohort diversity and other objectives for various production possibility
20 In the 4 years between 1986–87 and 1990–91, on average, private schools used 42 percent of
their sticker price increases to increase financial aid; in the next 4 years, the share of the increase
in announced prices they committed to financial aid increased to 60 percent—with the changes
concentrated in the hardest pressed part of the private sector. This trend undoubtedly has continued,
as schools are increasingly competing not only on the amount of the aid but also on the form of
aid—grants as opposed to loans, work-study programs, and the like (Winston 1999, pp. 30–31).
21 Duffy and Goldberg (1998, p. 224) document how schools may use knowledge about students’
price elasticities as a tool to manage enrollment and shape a class. Examples they provide include
one school’s generous financial aid packages to prospective humanities majors, another’s modest
packages for ED students, and another’s attractive packages for affluent applicants. Moreover, our
data, consisting of a cross section of top-ranked schools appearing in the annual U.S. News and
World Report rankings, show that increases in the percentages of students enrolled through ED
programs are associated with significant decreases in the percentages of students who apply for aid,
significant decreases in the percentages of students who demonstrate need, and significant increases
in the percentages of students whose needs are fully met. The percentages of those who receive merit
aid decrease significantly as schools’ reliance on ED enrollments increases.
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Figure 1. Production possibility frontiers and revenue expansion paths
frontiers (PPFs).22 We assume that there are diminishing returns to expenditures
on both objectives. Curve O1C1 illustrates feasible combinations of cohort di-
versity and other objectives when no students are enrolled through an ED pro-
gram. Adopting ED can increase revenue, but it also involves higher adminis-
trative costs. Thus, a school that is unlikely to attract a large enough pool of
qualified ED applicants is unlikely to offer ED as an option. For schools that
can attract enough ED students, adoption of an ED program can increase a
school’s resources and cause an outward shift in the PPF. As long as the percentage
22 Figure 1 shows a school’s production possibility frontiers (PPFs) for cohort diversity and other
objectives. Each curve assumes a percentage enrolled through an ED program and a given level of
school revenue. The curve O1C1 assumes that the ED program breaks even (incremental revenues
equal incremental costs of the program). Increasing the percentage of the class enrolled through ED
produces a technological change that shifts the curve outward. As the percentage of students enrolled
early increases, the PPF shift eventually results in a shift inward on the x-axis, as it is not possible
to increase diversity with a very large percentage of students enrolled early (100 percent at the
maximum). Curve O4C4 illustrates the PPF associated with a high percentage of students enrolled
early. The revenue expansion paths represent utility-maximizing tangencies. Three possibilities are
shown: REP1, REP2, and REP3.
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of students admitted under ED is not too large, each additional ED student adds
to the resource pool and shifts the curve outward. The ED enrollment rate
determines the magnitude of the shift, so curve O2C2 corresponds to a specific
(low) enrollment rate, and curve O3C3 corresponds to a somewhat higher ED
enrollment rate.
However, as a school with fixed enrollment increases the percentage of students
enrolled through ED, it necessarily sacrifices the number of spots available to
students during the regular admission process. Beyond some point, the per-
centage of students admitted through ED becomes a binding constraint on the
ability to achieve diversity. Since ED pools are less socioeconomically diverse
than an average pool and a school may sacrifice academic quality when it admits
ED students, a school that enrolls a high percentage of its students through ED
would be expected to experience a reduction in the ability to achieve cohort
diversity (curve O4C4).
Initially, increasing the ED enrollment rate shifts the PPF outward, which
allows a school to achieve both greater diversity and a higher level of other
objectives. For any given percentage of students admitted through ED, the
point of tangency of a school’s indifference curve and the PPF is the objective-
maximizing combination of cohort diversity and other objectives. The expansion
path in response to increases in revenue sources from an ED program is an
empirical question. Assuming that schools have objective functions with the
typical properties, we can trace out possible expansion paths (points of tangency
of PPFs and objective functions) as a school’s wealth changes and as the per-
centage of enrollment via an ED program changes. As can be seen from Figure
1, the model implies that with convex objectives, schools do not maximize their
current cohort diversity. Rather, they always select a point where some degree
of cohort diversity (relative to the maximum achievable) is sacrificed for other
objectives. However, the selected policy may yield a level of cohort diversity that
is greater or less than the level possible without an ED program.
We consider three possibilities, illustrated by revenue expansion paths REP1,
REP2, and REP3, each of which corresponds to testable implications that we
analyze below. The effect of ED enrollment on cohort diversity can be either
positive or negative depending on several factors. One is the percentage of ED
enrollment. For all schools, there is a maximum level of enrollment above which
the expansion path begins to curve back toward the other objectives axis. The
diminishing ability to improve cohort diversity at high rates of ED enrollment
will encourage all schools to spend additional resources from an ED program
on other objectives. A second factor is the relative value that a school puts on
cohort diversity compared with other objectives. The level of enrollment at which
the expansion path begins to curve toward the other objectives axis should be
higher at schools that place more value on cohort diversity.
The testable hypothesis underlying REP1 is that as reliance on ED increases
and the PPF shifts outward, cohort diversity increases over a range and then
decreases as the school increases its reliance on ED. The path REP2 suggests that
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as reliance on ED increases, cohort diversity falls continuously, as the school
uses additional revenue generated from higher ED enrollments on other objec-
tives. The path REP3 illustrates a third possibility: ED reduces diversity at lower
levels of ED enrollment and then increases until the constraining effect of high
ED enrollment becomes binding on the ability to increase diversity, beyond which
point diversity falls. (The empirical model we employ to test these hypotheses
appears in Section 5.) Our results are most consistent with REP2: cohort diversity
is generally decreasing over all ranges of ED enrollment.
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our empirical analysis is based on 4 years of admissions and enrollment data
for selective private schools in the United States—those listed as the “Best Na-
tional Universities” and “Best Liberal Arts Colleges” by U.S. News and World
Report. To provide consistency in admission and financial aid policies, we include
only private schools. Public schools have financing sources that are very different
from those of private colleges, and their admission decisions commonly are
significantly influenced by public policy, in contrast to those of private schools.
To provide roughly similar numbers of schools from each category each year,
and because so many of the top national universities are public, we draw our
sample from the top 150 national universities and from the entire list of the
“Best Liberal Arts Colleges,” which is generally around 110 colleges.23 In contrast
to national universities, these colleges are predominantly private. Our data con-
sists of 700 school-year observations representing 189 unique private schools.
Unless otherwise noted, when we refer to national universities, liberal arts col-
leges, or schools, we are referring to private schools. In the results below, we
include an indicator variable for liberal arts college, which equals one if the
school is a liberal arts college and zero if the school is a national university. All
data on schools’ characteristics, admissions, financial aid, and so forth were
collected from the detailed versions of the “Best College Rankings” reports pub-
lished annually online (but not archived) by U.S. News and World Report for
2004–7.
Our main variable of interest is a school’s decision to adopt an ED program.
We create an indicator variable for ED, which equals one if the school has an
ED program and zero otherwise. We are also interested in the intensity of the
use of ED, as proxied by the percentage of first-year students enrolled through
ED. Unfortunately, when schools report their enrollment information for first-
year students, they report the total percentage who enrolled through ED and/
or EA, but they do not break out the percentages by program type. For those
schools that have only an ED program (and not an EA program), we know the
23 We exclude Brigham Young University for all years (because its tuition and admission structure
resembles that of a public rather than a private school) and Tulane University in 2004 (because the
school’s admission process was dismantled during the rebuilding following Hurricane Katrina).
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exact percentage enrolled through ED. However, we do not know the exact
percentage enrolled through ED for those schools that have both an ED and an
EA program (12 percent of our observations). We deal with this issue in two
ways. In the results below, we include only those schools that have an ED program
and do not have an EA program. We test the sensitivity of the results by running
the same regressions for schools that have both an ED and an EA program and
impute a value for the percentage enrolled through ED. The imputed value is
based on the statistical information for schools that have only ED programs.24
Table 1 provides variable definitions and the overall summary statistics for
the key variables used in the study, as well as summary statistics by a school’s
decision to adopt an ED program. We also consider and control for different
school types—namely, liberal arts colleges versus national universities, schools
that report a religious affiliation, women’s colleges, and whether the school is
located in an urban environment.
We find that ED is pervasive, as 64 percent of the schools had an ED program
in force during 2004–7. This percentage is even higher for the most selective
schools, as 100 percent of the top 25 ranked liberal arts colleges and 67 percent
of the top 25 private universities used ED during the sample period. In addition,
liberal arts colleges, which enroll significantly smaller student bodies than do
national universities, rely more heavily on ED admission programs. Approxi-
mately 70 percent (43 percent) of the observations with (without) an ED program
are liberal arts colleges and, on average, 29 percent of the first-year class enrolls
through ED. The results also suggest that schools with a religious affiliation are
significantly less likely to use ED and that schools in more urban areas are less
likely to rely on ED than are schools in suburban and rural areas.
3.1. School Cohort Diversity Measures
School cohort diversity characteristics include the HHI as a heterogeneity
measure. The HHI is measured as the sum of the squared shares of the incoming
first-year class who are (1) African American, (2) Asian American, (3) Hispanic,
(4) Native American, and (5) white. A more racially and ethnically heterogeneous
cohort will be associated with a lower HHI. We also considered an alternative
measure that combines Asian Americans and whites as a single category, as many
institutions of higher education do not include Asian Americans as targeted
24 For those schools that have only an ED program and not an EA program and positive values
for the proportion enrolled through ED, we run a regression at the first, second, third, and fourth
percentiles of the proportion enrolled through ED, in which the dependent variable is equal to the
reported percentage enrolled through ED and the independent variables are undergraduate student
size, endowment per student, a dummy for liberal arts, the percentage of the graduating class who
borrowed, the percentage of first-year students whose financial needs were fully met, community
diversity, and year dummies. Using the betas from each of the percentile regressions, we predict
what the values would be for the percentage enrolled through ED for schools that have both an ED
program and an EA program. For those schools that have both programs, the imputed percentage
enrolled through ED equals the predicted value from the 25th percentile from the above regression
and whose actual proportion enrolled was in the 25th percentile; we repeat for all the percentiles.
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minorities for the purpose of admission. According to the American Council on
Education, Asian Americans and whites are the only two groups in which young
adults are more educated than prior generations (Ryu 2009, p. 1).25 As the results
using this alternative definition are very similar, for expositional ease they are
not reported in the paper.
As shown in Table 1, the average heterogeneity of the incoming student body
appears to be similar for schools with and without ED programs. Moreover,
schools that adopt ED enroll significantly fewer Hispanics, but the summary
statistics do not reveal any other significant differences in enrollments by racial
and ethnic categories. Schools that adopt ED attract significantly more out-of-
state students.
3.2. Competitive Environment
We test the hypothesis that the competitive environment, defined as the num-
ber of competitors a school faces, has a positive impact on the choice to use
ED. Avery and Levin (2010), for example, provide a theoretical model of early
admission that emphasizes that by adopting an ED policy, lower ranked schools
can attract some highly qualified (but cautious) students from more highly
ranked schools. The more competition a school faces, the more likely it is that
the school will try to preempt competition by securing students early (most
likely, the inelastic demanders) and will try to preserve financial aid for the more
price-sensitive students.
To construct a proxy for the number of competitors, we identify schools with
similar academic standings and geographic markets. For the geographic com-
ponent, we rely on the market definition that was used in the DOJ antitrust case
against the Ivy Overlap Group (selective schools in the northeastern United
States).26 We obtained zip code data for each Ivy Overlap Group school and
measured the driving distances between the zip code centroid for each school
pair. The longest distance between any pair of schools in the Ivy Overlap Group
is slightly less than 500 miles. On the basis of this, we assume that the geographic
market for each school is defined by a 500-mile radius, and we measure com-
petitive pressure based on schools within that radius. The underlying assumption
is that while schools may attract students from all regions of the United States,
and even internationally, on the margin, students of a given quality will find it
more desirable to attend college close to home. McMillen, Singell, and Waddell
(2007) provide supporting evidence that the market for students in higher ed-
ucation depends on proximity of competitors and institutional quality.
25 The American Council on Education reports annually on enrollment and education rates by
ethnic groups. In 2006, 61 percent of Asian Americans ages 18–24 were enrolled in college, compared
with 44 percent of whites, 32 percent of African Americans, and 25 percent of Hispanics and Native
Americans (Ryu 2009).
26 While the Ivy Overlap Group’s combined market share of total undergraduate enrollments in
the United States is small (less than 1 percent), as Bamberger and Carlton (2004) point out, the ex-
istence of the Overlap process indicates that the schools had market power.
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The other dimension of competition implicit in the Ivy Overlap Group case
is school quality or rank. Schools that compete effectively with each other for a
given student generally share selectivity measures. Using this reasoning, we as-
sume that a given school competes for students who have similar SAT scores.
For each school, i, in the database, we count the number of schools within a
500-mile radius that reported incoming average SAT math scores within 50 points
(approximately 1 standard deviation of that school’s scores), where the standard
deviation is measured over all school years in the sample.27 The number of
schools meeting both the distance and the SAT criteria are summed to generate
the measure for the number of competitors for each school. Because the annual
lists of “Best National Universities” and “Best Liberal Arts Colleges” from U.S.
News and World Reports concentrate on relatively selective schools, we may not
observe all potential competitors of the lower ranked schools in our sample. By
inspection, the potential for truncation to bias the estimated number of com-
petitors could begin to affect the estimated number of competitors for universities
ranked below about 150 and liberal arts colleges ranked below about 100. To
correct for this truncation bias, we make a conservative upward adjustment to
the observed number of competitors for schools near the bottom of the rankings,
where the adjustment is based on the observed distributions of the number of
schools ordered by SAT math score.28 While for theoretical reasons we argue
that it is important to account for this bias, this adjustment does not lead to
materially different results.29
On average, on the basis of our measure, the number of competitors a school
faces is 34.6. As we predicted, schools that adopt an ED program face a larger
number of competitors (mean of 38) than do schools that do not adopt an ED
program (mean of 29).
27 We measured the distance from all possible school combinations as centroid of zip code to
centroid of zip code using Zip Code Wizard software.
28 To account for truncation bias, we assume that the national number of schools within 50 points
of a given SAT math score is decreasing in score (that is, there are fewer schools with SAT math
scores within 1 standard deviation of 700 than there are within 1 standard deviation of 600). We
order schools by SAT math scores and determine the maximum number of schools nationally that
are within 50 points of each school’s SAT math score average. That number is 122 (associated with
an SAT math score of 626). We assume no truncation bias for schools with that mean SAT math
score or higher. For each school with a lower mean SAT math score, we multiply the number of
observed competitors within 500 miles by (122/n), where n is the national number of sample schools
that have SAT math scores within 50 points of the subject school’s SAT score. This process is equivalent
to assuming that for scores below 626, the national number of schools within 50 SAT math score
points is expected to be constant at 122 and that observed lower numbers reflect the probability of
truncation. As mean SAT math scores fall, adjustments are made, with most adjustment factors only
slightly above 1.0. The size of the adjustment increases at the lower end of the rankings, with nine
schools having adjustment factors greater than 2.0.
29 We tested the robustness of the results by deleting those schools whose competition measures
were most affected by the truncation adjustment factor (those with factors greater than 3 and greater
than 5) as well as by using the unadjusted competition measure. The results are not affected materially.
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3.3. Other School Characteristics and Financial Aid Measures
Table 1 also presents percentile rankings (25th and 75th) for SAT math scores
for students enrolled in college. Schools that adopt ED programs are associated
with students who achieve higher SAT math test scores compared with schools
that do not adopt such programs.30 Financial aid characteristics also differ across
schools’ policy choices about ED. Schools that adopt ED tend to rely less on
loans for financial aid and are more likely to fully meet the financial needs of
first-year students.31
The variable HHI-C is intended to capture the diversity of the population in
the geographic area surrounding the school, which we expect will affect the
ability of the school to attract a diverse student body. To consider this, we
construct the community diversity measure (HHI-C) for each school and use
zip code radius software to determine the composition of the population in a
500-mile radius from the centroid of the zip code of the school’s location. The
measure is the sum of the squared shares of the percentages of the total population
who are Asian (which includes those with Hawaiian and Pacific Islander an-
cestry), Native American, African American, Hispanic, and white. The data are
drawn from the 2000 U.S. census.
4. The Determinants of Schools’ Choice to Use Early Decision
Which schools use ED? To analyze this question, we model the propensity to
use ED (ED*) as
ED* p bX   , (1)it it it
where I indexes schools, and t indexes time. The term EDit equals ∼ N(0, 1),ij
one if a school chooses to use ED and zero otherwise.
The vector Xit includes school characteristics—undergraduate student body
size, endowment per student, indicator variables for school type (liberal arts,
religious, women’s, black, and urban), SAT math scores, and year fixed effects.
Endowment per student is a proxy for the wealth of the school. We expect it to
be negatively related to the choice to offer ED—those schools that are the most
resource constrained are likely to be those that adopt ED as a revenue-generating
device. Relative to universities, liberal arts colleges (including all women’s col-
leges) are likely to face tighter resource constraints—they do not benefit as much
from economies of scale, they do not have sports teams that generate revenues,
and they are less likely to attract grant money. Thus, the expected sign on the
30 These patterns also hold true for SAT verbal scores or a combination of SAT math and verbal
scores. Those results are available from the authors upon request.
31 In 1994, Congress created an antitrust exemption that sanctioned efforts by institutions practicing
need-blind admissions to discuss and agree on common principles of financial aid need analysis.
The schools that participate in this effort form the 568 Presidents’ Group, which currently includes
25 schools (568 Presidents’ Group, Membership [http://www.568group.org/membership]).
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liberal arts college indicator is positive. The other indicator variables are included
as controls for school characteristics.
In addition, Xit includes school aid characteristics (the percentage of the grad-
uating class who have borrowed and the percentage of the first-year class whose
financial needs were fully met) and year fixed effects. To control for the possibility
that the choice to use ED may be influenced by the heterogeneity of the pop-
ulation of the community in which the school is located, Xit also includes HHI-
C as an exogenous variable.
The variables we include in Xit are consistent with the findings in the literature
on students’ application behavior and student-school matching behavior. Avery,
Fairbanks, and Zeckhauser (2005) reinforce the point that students can observe
some characteristics that colleges possess and can make choices on the basis of
those attributes (for example, location, the expected quality of peer group, tuition,
and financial aid characteristics) but that latent indices of desirability of the
school cannot be measured directly and will vary by student. While latent at-
tributes undoubtedly affect college selection, there is no reason to believe that
these attributes vary systematically with our outcome variables. Avery and Levin
(2010) point out that ED can be used to signal student interest in a specific
school, thereby facilitating matching.
There also is evidence of self-selection into schools with specific clienteles (see,
for example, Fryer and Greenstone 2007). We control for this behavior by in-
cluding indicator variables for women’s colleges, historically black or predom-
inantly African American colleges, and colleges with religious affiliations. Finally,
we evaluated some alternative community demographic measures to consider
the possibility that the community HHI measure only partially controls for the
pool of potential students from which the school draws.32 However, the results
did not change in any substantive way, so the tables show results for the more
parsimonious specification.
Finally, on the basis of the analysis above, as constrained optimizers, schools
will rationally seek ways to reduce their competitive pressure. In this context,
ED can be used to identify students with inelastic demand for the school and
then make binding, preemptive admission offers to those students. Thus, Xit
includes controls for the competitive environment (the number of competitors),
and we expect the adoption of ED to be positively related to the competitive
environment that a school faces.
The probability that a school uses ED is given by
32 As a potentially more refined measure, we include the absolute number of members of different
demographic groups in the community. The additional measure takes on varying values depending
on the diversity measure. For the school Herfindahl-Hirshman index (HHI) equation, we use the
total nonwhite population in the community scaled by school size (total enrollments). For the
equations for the percentages of white, African American, Hispanic, Asian American, and Native
American students, we use the total population in the group scaled by school size. For the percentage
of out-of-state students, we use the total state population; there is no change to the equation for
the percentage of international students.
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Table 2
Determinants of the Decision to Adopt an Early Decision
Program: All Schools, 2004–7
Marginal Effect SE
School characteristics:
Undergraduate student body size/1,000 .003 .014
Endowment per student/($100,000) .029* .008
25th Percentile for SAT math .002 .002
75th Percentile for SAT math .002 .002
Liberal arts .380* .116
Religious .192* .091
Women .290* .052
Black .038 .269
Urban .034 .080
Competitive environment measure: competitors .009* .002
School aid and award measures:
% Graduating class who borrowed .007* .003
% First years with needs fully met .003 .002
Community diversity measure: HHI-C/100 .007 .007
Note. Results are from a probit model of the choice to adopt an early decision
(ED) program. The data are based on 700 school-year observations. Year fixed
effects are included. Robust standard errors are adjusted for clustering by school.
 .p ! .10
* .p ! .05
Pr(ED p 1) p Pr(bX   1 0) p F(bX ), (2)it it it it
where F is the standard normal cumulative density function.
Table 2 reports the estimated determinants of a school’s choice to use ED. To
facilitate interpretation, we report the marginal effects (evaluated at means) and
standard errors (calculated using the delta method). As predicted, when school
attributes such as undergraduate student body size, endowment per student,
financial aid offers, school type, and community diversity are held constant, the
number of competitors a school faces is positively related to the choice to adopt
ED. To be specific, the larger the number of competitors, the more likely it is
that a school will offer an ED option in an attempt to lock in students who
might choose to go to a competitor.
As shown in Table 2, liberal arts colleges are 38 percentage points more likely
than national universities to have ED programs. Because all women’s colleges
are also liberal arts colleges, the coefficient for the variable shows the impact of
the women’s college attribute relative to other liberal arts colleges. It is significant
and positive. This result is not surprising, as liberal arts colleges enroll fewer
students and offer a smaller array of majors to prospective students than do
national universities but compete in the broader market nonetheless. They pro-
vide a distinct product—such as small classes, residential campuses, and more
inclusive athletics programs—that appeals to a segment of the student popu-
lation. We expect that the strategic use of ED will be, on net, more beneficial
to liberal arts colleges than to national universities. We had no a priori expec-
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tations regarding the other school type indicator variables, but the results suggest
that schools reporting a religious affiliation may be able to successfully attract
their desired cohort without relying on ED. The results also show that as a
school’s endowment per student increases, the likelihood of adopting ED de-
clines. Wealthier schools face lower tuition revenue pressure than their less
wealthy competitors, which implies that they have less incentive to rely on ED
programs to price discriminate, with other factors holding constant.
Finally, financial aid characteristics are significantly related to ED—if schools
adopt ED and can effectively price discriminate, they are better positioned to
ensure that they can meet the full financial needs of the first-year class and can
be less reliant on loans as a component of that financial aid (presumably for
students who are admitted during the regular admission phase). It is possible
that a school’s aid and award measures are endogenously determined with ED.
That is, ambitious financial aid programs, such as those that commit to fully
meeting need and to eliminating loans, may create an incentive for a school to
adopt or rely more on an ED program to make these financial aid programs
more affordable. While we do not try to unravel this possibility here, our results
based on the regression models that follow are robust to the exclusion of these
variables.
5. The Effect of Early Decision on Cohort Diversity
We use two approaches to estimate the effect of ED on cohort diversity—a
single-equation, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate that assumes that ED is
exogenous to cohort diversity and an instrumental variables (IV) approach that
does not. We discuss each in turn.
5.1. Single-Equation Estimates
First, we assume that a school’s choice to use ED is exogenous to cohort
diversity. Our model of cohort diversity is
CD p gZ  dED  h , (3)it it it it
where . The term CDit is one of our eight school cohort diversityh ∼ N(0, 1)it
measures (HHI and the percentages of students who are African American,
Hispanic, Asian American, Native American, white, international, and reside out
of state). The term EDit is the measure of a school’s choice in year t to use ED,
and Zit is a vector of school characteristics (undergraduate student body size,
endowment per student, indicators for school type, and SAT math scores),33
school aid characteristics (the percentage of the graduating class who have bor-
rowed and the percentage of the first-year class whose financial needs were fully
met), a community diversity measure, and year fixed effects.
33 Results in this regression, and others that follow, are not sensitive to using alternative measures
of SAT scores (including verbal scores or a combination of math and verbal scores).
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Table 3 presents the OLS estimates of the effect of ED on each of our eight
cohort diversity measures. The OLS results indicate that ED is associated with
more student body homogeneity, measured by a higher HHI. The results also
show that ED is negatively related to the percentage of students enrolled from
all nonwhite groups except for African Americans. Under ED, enrollment of
white students is higher by 3.0 percent, which is offset by the reduction in the
representation of the other nonwhite groups. In addition, schools with ED pro-
grams have more out-of-state students relative to student populations at other
schools, which is a measure of geographic diversity. These findings seem to
support the notion that schools with ED programs are using the extra revenue
from such programs to fund priorities of the school other than cohort diversity.
5.2. Accounting for Omitted-Variable Bias
The single-equation estimates assume that a school’s decision to adopt ED is
exogenous to the cohort diversity of a school. However, it could be that het-
erogeneity in schools’ underlying admission criteria (for example, the importance
of legacy, intellectual passion, leadership attributes, participation in athletics, and
the like) is likely to affect both the decision to adopt ED and cohort diversity.
An omitted-variable bias implies that , which leads OLS regressionE(h FED ) ( 0it it
models to produce biased estimates of the effects of ED. If a school’s underlying
admission criteria decreases diversity and increases the propensity to adopt ED,
then the OLS estimates of the effect of ED on diversity will be understated. For
example, if schools that tend to place great importance on legacy are more likely
to be ED adopters and are also more likely to appeal to white students, then
the OLS estimates of the effect of ED on cohort diversity will be understated.
Because we are agnostic about possible sources of bias, we do not attempt to
sign the possible bias.
In an attempt to address the omitted-variable bias, we reestimate equations
(1) and (3) using a treatment-effects model that allows us to account for the
possible correlation in the unobserved determinants of ED and cohort diversity.34
For the model to be identified, Xit must contain at least one extra variable not
contained in Zit. We use the number of competitors of the observed school, i,
as our instrument, as it is expected to influence the choice to adopt ED but to
influence cohort diversity only indirectly through the choice to adopt ED. The
data in Table 2 provide support for this identification strategy, as schools that
face more competitors (defined on both geographic and student quality dimen-
sions) are significantly more likely to adopt ED. Early decision programs allow
schools facing more competition to better manage their enrollments and to
34 We use the TREATREG command in STATA 10.0 to estimate the treatment-effects model using
a two-step consistent estimator. Unlike the standard instrumental variable approach, namely, two-
stage least squares, TREATREG allows the first-stage equation to be nonlinear (a probit model).
Although the two-stage least squares results on the variable of interest (the decision to adopt ED)
appear to be somewhat larger in magnitude than the TREATREG results, Hausman-like tests reveal
that the results are not statistically different.
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generate revenue from these efforts, which can then be used for various priorities,
including possibly attracting more minority students during the regular admis-
sion process. Moreover, the number of competitors is unlikely to contribute
directly to cohort diversity in any measurable way given that our cohort diversity
equation already includes detailed measures of student quality (SAT scores),
wealth (endowment per student), an urban indicator variable, and a community
diversity measure. Furthermore, the F-statistic from the first-stage regression
exceeds 10, which indicates that weak instruments are not a concern (see Staiger
and Stock 1997).35
To further assess the validity of the instrument, we construct a placebo test
that uses OLS regressions to estimate the effect of the competition instrument
on college diversity for those schools that did not adopt ED, ceteris paribus.
Finding no effect supports the validity of the instrument in that diversity does
not covary with competition when ED is not adopted. The results show that the
competition instrument is not significant in the diversity regression when we
measure diversity by school HHI (7.105, with a robust standard error of 6.524)
and is not significant for the components of HHI (the enrolled percentages of
various racial and ethnic groups), with the exception of the percentage of Native
American students. In addition, competition is not significant in the regressions
of geographic diversity measured as the percentages of international students
and out-of-state students.36
As a final check on the identification approach, we use restriction tests to
evaluate the added explanatory power of the competition measure in equation
(1). First, using a likelihood ratio (LR) test, we compare the unrestricted model
(which includes competition in Xit) and the restricted model (which excludes
competition in Xit) and conclude that the unrestricted model is stronger (LR x
2
p 75.06, ).37 Second, we compare the pseudo-R2 values from the un-p p .000
restricted model and from the restricted model, and we find that the pseudo-
R2 value increases from .27 to .35, which provides further evidence that adding
competition improves the fit of the model.38 Taken together, the findings suggest
that competition is an important determinant of the choice to adopt ED.
Table 3 presents the results for the effect of ED programs on our measures
of cohort diversity from the OLS model and the second stage of the IV (treatment
effects) model. The IV results are qualitatively consistent with those of the OLS,
35 The F-statistic from the first stage ranges from 12 to 16 with a p-value of .00, depending on
the measure of diversity under consideration in the second stage.
36 We evaluated another potential instrument that proxies for competition—a measure of the
growth in state population ages 5–17 in the years leading up to the sample period. However, this
measure is less precise than the competition measure, and it does not adequately identify the first
stage.
37 A Wald test reconfirms the findings of the likelihood ratio test (Wald ; ).2x p 15.07 p p .000
38 We also calculated the percentage of assignments correctly predicted in the unrestricted model
relative to a number of alternative restricted models (for example, including competition only or
excluding competition in Xit). While the order in which the variables are added affects the relative
importance of the variables, we find that competition explains between 3 and 21 percent of the
overall variation.
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although the magnitudes of the effects of ED are larger under the IV specification.
For instance, the IV (OLS) results show that Asian American student enrollment
is higher by 3.4 (2.0) percent. Relative to the mean, whether one considers the
OLS or the IV results, the effects seem reasonable. To be specific, adoption of
ED increases student body homogeneity by 15 (5) percent relative to the mean
for the IV (OLS) results. Similarly, schools that adopt ED increase enrollment
of white students, relative to the mean, by 9.0 (4.0) percent for the IV (OLS)
results. Early decision is associated with an increase in out-of-state student en-
rollment of 21.0 (14.0) percent for the IV (OLS) regressions.39
Second-stage results for the other independent variables are also shown in
Table 3. The results indicate the importance of school type in predicting diversity.
For example, holding other factors, including the presence of ED, constant, we
find that schools with religious affiliations, historically black and predominantly
African American colleges, and liberal arts colleges are associated with less di-
versity, while women’s colleges are associated with more diversity.
The results shed light on the underlying hypotheses generated from Figure 1.
To the extent that a school’s PPFs are enhanced with the adoption of ED, these
initial results suggest that additional revenues associated with ED programs are
not being used to attract more diverse student cohorts during the regular ad-
mission phase. In fact, both the OLS and IV results indicate that adoption of
ED decreases the racial diversity of the student body.
5.3. The Relationship between Early Decision Enrollment
Rates and Cohort Diversity
A further refinement of the hypotheses generated by Figure 1 suggests that
there may be varying effects of ED on cohort diversity that depend on the
intensity of the use of ED, as proxied by the percentage of enrolled students
who were admitted through an ED program. The range of reliance on ED for
enrollment is very large—from a low of 3 percent of the student body to a high
of 58 percent (the mean is 28.9 percent). The relationship between the percentage
of students enrolled early and cohort diversity need not be monotonic, and as
Figure 1 suggests, there may be some levels of ED enrollment that are associated
with more cohort diversity.
Because we have no a priori expectation as to the functional relationship
between ED enrollment and diversity, we analyze the data by enrollment quartile.
To formally take into account the intensity of the use of ED, we reestimate
equation (1) using OLS for those schools that adopted an ED program and for
which we have a precise measure of the percentage of students enrolled through
ED (365 observations).40 For cases in which the school offers both EA and ED,
39 A small number of colleges switched ED status during our panel, but there are too few to con-
fidently employ a difference-in-differences model to estimate the effect of ED.
40 Given that the OLS results and the IV (treatment-effects) results in the previous section are
qualitatively similar, and because we are unable to identify two additional instruments, we do not
address the potential endogeneity of the intensity of use of ED.
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the school reports an aggregate percentage of students who were admitted early
without distinguishing between those admitted via EA versus those admitted via
ED, and, thus, we omit these schools from the analysis.41 We replace the ED
variable with indicator variables representing the proportion of first-year students
enrolled through ED programs by quartile. We construct indicator variables for
each quartile: the indicator for the first quartile equals one if the percentage of
first-year students enrolled in ED programs is less than 20 percent and zero
otherwise; for the second quartile, the indicator equals one if the percentage of
students enrolled through ED programs is between 20 percent and 30 percent
and zero otherwise; for the third quartile, the indicator equals one if the per-
centage of first-year students enrolled through ED programs is between 31 per-
cent and 38 percent and zero otherwise; and for the fourth quartile, the indicator
equals one if the percentage of first-year students enrolled through ED programs
is greater than 38 percent and zero otherwise.
Table 4 shows the results of an OLS regression analysis of the effect of the
percentage of ED enrollments on the eight diversity measures. The regression
models also include controls for community diversity (HHI-C), school type, the
number of students enrolled, school wealth, student financial aid, SAT scores,
and year dummies (results for control variables are available upon request).
The results should be viewed with caution, as the percentage of students
enrolled is arguably endogenous, but we were not able to find satisfactory in-
struments. With this caveat in mind, we can interpret the results to show that
our summary measures of diversity decline as schools rely more on ED, and
there is no range of early enrollment over which diversity increases. Referring
to Figure 1, we see that the overall pattern is most consistent with REP2. The
HHI is at a maximum (diversity is at a minimum) when schools enroll more
than 38 percent of their students through an ED program. The results for specific
racial and ethnic groups punctuate this general pattern. Higher enrollments of
ED students negatively affect enrollments of Hispanic students. The evidence for
Hispanic students suggests that increasing the percentage of students who are
enrolled early beyond 20 percent is significant and negative, but the effects for
the upper quartiles are not statistically different from each other. The evidence
is weaker for Native American students, but the impact on Native American
students’ enrollments is significant and negative for schools enrolling more than
38 percent of their students early. For African American students, the effects of
more school reliance on ED are not significant.
The results for the effects on Asian American students are statistically strong,
which indicates that increased school reliance on ED has a monotonic and
negative effect on enrollments of Asian Americans. These lower enrollments may
occur either because schools shy away from enrolling Asian American students
41 We also ran the same regressions for all schools that have an ED program, including those that
also have an EA program, and impute a value for the percentage enrolled through ED for schools
that have both programs (see note 25 for details). The results reveal the same general patterns,
although they are somewhat less precisely estimated, and are available upon request.
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Table 4
The Effect of Intensity of Use of Early Decision on Cohort Diversity Measures
School Cohort Diversity Measure Second Quartile Third Quartile Fourth Quartile
HHI 443.166a 679.473a 838.507a,b
(225.148) (237.506) (257.565)
Student diversity measures:
African American .017 .351 .309
(.474) (.458) (.548)
Asian American 1.120 2.474a 3.859a,b,c
(.924) (.946) (1.002)
Hispanic 1.053 1.493a 1.967a
(.653) (.726) (.812)
Native American .037 .217 .362b,c
(.203) (.274) (.227)
White 3.204a 4.943a 6.052a,b
(1.682) (1.773) (1.903)
International .832 1.485a .465c
(.735) (.733) (.872)
Out of state 2.800 7.648a,b 7.724a
(3.406) (3.725) (4.563)
Note. Coefficient estimates are from ordinary least squares regressions. Results are based on 365 ob-
servations of schools with early decision (ED) programs during 2004–7. For each observation, ED
enrollment percentages are classified into the first, second, third, and fourth quartiles to create an indicator
for the relevant quartile. Regressions include the quartile indicators (the first quartile is omitted) and
controls for school characteristics, school aid and award measures, a community diversity measure, and
year fixed effects. Observations for historically black and predominantly African American colleges are
excluded. Standard errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for clustering by school. HHI p Herfindahl-
Hirshman index.
a Means between the proportion of first-year students enrolled in ED programs at the second, third,
and fourth quartiles and the first quartile are significantly different at .p ! .10
b Means between the proportion of first-year students enrolled in ED programs at the third and fourth
quartiles and the second quartile are significantly different at .p ! .10
c Means between the proportion of first-year students enrolled in ED programs at the fourth quartile
and the third quartile are significantly different at .p ! .10
as they rely more on ED or because these students may tend to opt out of ED
programs, preferring instead to rely on the regular admission process, which
offers choices across competing schools and aid offers. Our data do not allow
us to distinguish between these two hypotheses. In addition, as is shown, reliance
on ED generally has a negative effect on international students’ enrollments (it
is most negative for the third quartile) but has a positive impact on enrollments
of students from out of state.
6. Conclusions and Discussion
From an economics perspective, as described here and elsewhere, ED programs
have the potential to benefit both students and schools. They can, of course,
reduce uncertainty for the student and reduce the risk associated with enrollment
management for colleges and universities. In particular, though, we consider the
implications of ED for schools’ incentives to price discriminate through ED
programs. Schools that adopt ED effectively bifurcate their admission process.
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In the ED phase, they are positioned to identify and admit inelastic demanders
who are more likely to be full-pay students. They then are positioned to compete
more effectively in the regular admission phase on financial aid and merit-based
offers to students who contribute to the quality and diversity of the student
body. Hence, we might expect that diversity is increased through ED. However,
in a resource-constrained environment, the marginal revenue from admitting
full-pay students early can be used for other purposes, such as improving the
faculty, investing in the physical plant, augmenting technology on campus, and
so on.
We examine several measures of diversity: the percentages of students enrolled
who are African American, Asian American, Native American, Hispanic, and
white in an HHI of the overall heterogeneity of the student body and geographic
diversity (international students and students enrolled from out of state). To
study the impact of ED on diversity, we use a single-equation framework that
implicitly assumes that the school’s choice to adopt ED is exogenous and a
treatment-effects model that incorporates the endogeneity of a school’s choice
to adopt ED. An obvious candidate for an instrument for the IV estimation is
the number of competitors a school faces for students, a measure that reflects
the geographic density of schools with students of similar academic standing.
Our statistical analysis reinforces the validity of competition as an instrument,
and we find that schools that face more competition are more likely than other
schools to adopt ED.
The evidence for the impact of ED does not support a view that cohort diversity
is improved (or is unaffected) by the adoption of these programs. Instead, we
find that ED has a significant and negative impact on cohort racial diversity. We
also study the subset of schools that have adopted ED and find that the overall
heterogeneity of the students, measured by HHI, falls monotonically as schools
enroll greater percentages of their students through ED programs. The results
of the impact on specific racial and ethnic groups are more nuanced. Compared
to other groups, Asian American and Hispanic students are the most likely to
be squeezed out as schools’ reliance on ED enrollments increases. The magnitude
of the effect is more severe for Asian American students. This may be attributable
to those students who opt out of ED programs and decide instead to apply
during the regular admission period and gain the benefits associated with being
able to generate competing offers of admission and financial aid. For schools
with ED programs, one of the clear benefits of enrolling more students early is
that they attract more geographic diversity, as they enroll significantly more out-
of-state students.
It is likely that ED is a policy that is here to stay, and only the very top schools
are in positions to abandon it unilaterally. It is a useful tool for enrollment
management, but for most schools, it does not appear to be used as a means
to furthering goals they may have to improve student diversity. Instead, any
additional revenue generated by ED programs appears to be serving other in-
stitutional goals.
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